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Abstract 
New technologies are becoming advanced and complex for offshore production 
facilities. However this advancement and complexity in technology creates a more 
complicated and time consuming forensic processes for finding causes of failure, or 
diagnostic processes to identify events that reduce performance. As a result, micro-
sensors, efficient signaling and communication technologies for collecting data 
efficiently, advanced software tools (such as fuzzy logic, neural networks, and 
simulation based optimization) have been developed, in parallel, to manage such 
complex assets. Given the nature and scale of ongoing changes on complexities, there 
are emerging concerns that increasing complexities, ill-defined interfaces, unforeseen 
events can easily lead to serious performance failures and major risks.  
To avoid such undesirable circumstances, „just-in-time‟ measures of performance to 
ensure fully functional is absolutely necessary. The increasing trend in complexity 
creates a motivation to develop an integrated maintenance management framework to 
get real-time information to solve problems quickly and hence to increase functional 
performance (help the asset to perform its required function effectively and efficiently 
while safeguarding life and the environment). Establishing “just-in-time” maintenance 
and repairs based on true machine condition maximizes critical asset useful life and 
eliminates premature replacement of functional components.   
This thesis focuses on developing an integrated maintenance management framework 
to establish „just-in-time‟ maintenance and to ensure continuous improvements based 
on maintenance domain experts as well as operational and historic data. To do this, 
true degradation of components must be identified. True level of degradation often 
cannot be inferred by the mere trending of condition indicator‟s level (CBM), because 
condition indicator levels are modulated under the influence of the diverse operating 
context. Besides, the maintenance domain expert does not have a precise knowledge 
about the correlation of the diverse operating context and level of degradation for a 
given level of condition indicator on specific equipment. Efforts have been made in 
here to identify the true degradation pattern of a component by analyzing these 
vagueness and imprecise knowledge. 
Key words: effective and efficient maintenance strategy, ‘just-in-time’ maintenance,   
condition based maintenance, P-F interval. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Project Description and Formulation 
1.1 Introduction and Background  
Wear and tear is an unavoidable part of normal and aging of equipment and 
components. Besides design weakness and operational environment (human errors, 
unskilled personnel, over load etc) worsens the situation. Maintenance is therefore of 
key importance to maintain availability and functional performance.  
The maintenance of industrial assets has continued to develop and has moved from 
the former “fault repair” mentality to “fault prevention” strategy i.e. from reactive to 
proactive. Over the last few years, maintenance practices have significantly changed, 
from time/use based to condition based, relying on monitoring the condition of the 
equipment to determine the most cost effective frequency.  
By continuous monitoring the integrity of offshore production platform, the condition 
and performance of the industrial asset can be controlled leading to maximum 
production regularity at „minimum‟ maintenance cost. Increasingly important, is the 
enforcement of HSE as set in company goals and national and international 
regulations. This means “optimization of maintenance” does not refer to “cutting 
down maintenance costs to save money”; it is rather means balancing between 
fulfilling HSE requirements and maximizing production regularity.  
Development of integrated frame work for effective and efficient maintenance 
strategies (reactive/proactive, need based/opportunity based, failure/time/condition 
based, offline/online, RCM, RBI etc) involve the determination of what needs to be 
repaired when it needs to be repaired as well as prioritizing maintenance for each 
component/equipment in a complex, advanced and integrated production facilities.  
Maintenance programs for offshore installations are developed based on preventive 
maintenance routines recommended by the OEM manufacturers, using the experience 
of operators and by identification of best practices. In most of the cases the preventive 
maintenance schedules are either calendar based or based on the machine‟s run time. 
The method of determining the maintenance activities in this case may not be optimal. 
These days energy companies are under increasing pressure to reduce overall life 
cycle costs as well as maximize profit generated over time(i.e. maximize ROI);  meet 
performance goals with respect to functional capability, capacity, quality and 
availability; comply with standards, regulatory requirements, and  enhance the use of 
their organizational assets(to operate nearly at 100% asset utilization).  
Offshore production systems are becoming more advanced and complex by providing 
better functional performance than before. These high performance production 
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facilities represent high capital investment, new levels of complexity, shortage of 
experienced technical personnel and spare components. In addition to this, factors 
such as stringent regulatory requirements, and the ability to predict and prevent 
failures and to make informed decisions based on consolidated equipment health and 
performance data becomes critical. However such advanced, complex and integrated 
systems result in complex failure modes, which are more difficult to diagnose and 
repair, and becoming more complex to operate and maintain.  
In parallel With the development of new advanced and complex for offshore 
production facilities, micro-sensors, efficient signaling and communication 
technologies for collecting data efficiently, software tools (such as fuzzy logic, neural 
networks, and simulation based optimization) have been developed to manage such 
complex assets. However, this complexity creates a more complicated and time 
consuming forensic processes for finding causes of failure, or diagnostic processes to 
identify events that reduce performance. Given the nature and scale of ongoing 
changes on complexities, there are emerging concerns that increasing complexities, 
ill-defined interfaces, unforeseen events can easily lead to serious performance 
failures and major risks.  
The challenges remain to address includes: 
 Optimizing performance, integrity and  safety of critical equipments 
  To identify influence of failed components on other components in the system as 
the interdependency is complex. 
 Fully utilization of an asset i.e. nearly 100% availability(uptime/(uptime 
+downtime)) 
 Financial management -risk, cost and benefit (ROI). Cost, the level of risk and 
the benefits from risk control are closely linked, and hence cannot be evaluated 
separately. 
 Diminishing and limited personnel expertise in a demand growth environment 
Key question for researchers to address such challenges should be “What is the 
optimum preventive maintenance time interval?” Too short intervals would lead to 
unnecessary prevention costs; no preventive maintenance would lead to breakdowns, 
which may affect production, and inflict money losses on the firm as discussed 
previously; and too long intervals would result in both inconveniences, as they will 
involve preventive maintenance actions and would lead to uncontrolled breakdowns. 
A comprehensive overview helps to overcome unforeseen events and incidents that 
might lead to catastrophe.  
 Optimization of maintenance strategies to addresses such complex operating context 
is critical. There is a room for maximizing asset performance, prolonging effective 
operating time, minimizing repair costs and minimizing consequences of unplanned 
downtime, by maximizing the interval between scheduled maintenance services 
according to the equipment‟s real condition and by eliminating the reoccurrence of the 
7 
 
root cause of failures. Determinations of actual mean time to failures (MTTF) or loss 
of functionality (partial/full) of critical components, combines real time data (or near 
real time data) with operational and environmental factors, to define the true 
condition. Including RCM analysis, FTA, FMECA, RBI, and RCFA etc. will provide 
an understanding of failure, incipient failure, catastrophic failure and the underlying 
root causes. For this, relevant data indicators and design of instrumentation to collect 
data is critical. From data, algorisms can be developed to build equipment profiles, 
define normalcy, interpret conditions of interest and provide an overall understanding 
of the health or condition of the critical equipment and hence failures can be 
prevented or warned about in advance (detecting potential failures).  
In fact, even though some degraded components are replaced during PM activities, 
effects of the failed components on other parts of the system may go unnoticed and 
worsen the condition of the relative parts, and the system as a whole. Integrated 
approach to maintenance activities help to see the unnoticed incidents that might lead 
to catastrophe. Establishing “just-in-time” maintenance and repairs based on true 
machine condition maximizes critical asset useful life and eliminates premature 
replacement of functional components.  
A set of KPIs should be defined for monitoring and follow up of functional 
performance. The advances in sensor as well as inter communication technology 
(ICT) have enabled availability of useful information related to equipment condition 
and functional performance. This information provides some opportunities to 
diagnose and prognose critical components/equipments. Usually, there is no shortage 
of data and information. However, utilization and integration of realistic time data and 
to translate the data in to information and from information to knowledge, so as to 
make right decisions to choose and prioritize maintenance activities, remains as a 
challenge.  
Furthermore, managing functionality and technical performance of equipment 
connected to the safety functions is a key challenge faced by the operator companies 
on offshore Oil & Gas industries (e.g. Norwegian Continental Shelf,NCS).  The 
regulatory requirements are stringent to maintain and improve the technical condition 
of safety critical equipment. Any effort to reduce the corrective maintenance and/or 
optimize the maintenance programs will contribute greatly in the offshore O&G 
industry.  
On the NCS the maintenance programs are developed and maintenance activities 
prioritized based on the coarse consequence classification of equipments/subsystems 
(NORSOK Z008 rev. 2). This approach does not take into account individual failure 
modes of the equipment. To achieve the desire of achieving highest production 
regularity and „zero damages‟ to HSE due to equipment failures, it will be necessary 
to perform the maintenance activities that prevent unexpected equipment failures. 
Furthermore, the frequency of conducting maintenance activities has to be linked to 
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realistic mean time between failures. Moreover, functionality and true performance 
degradation of the equipment has to be monitored in a manner that sufficient time is 
available for the maintenance managers to plan and organize selected maintenance 
activity execution, (Panesar et al., 2008),  at the equipment level to develop optimized 
maintenance strategies. 
1.2 Maintenance Management Process 
The term maintenance management is defined in EN3306 as “all activities of 
management that determine objectives, strategies, and the responsibilities and 
implement them by means such as maintenance planning, maintenance control and 
supervision, improvement of methods in the organization including economical 
aspects.” The basic maintenance model, based on PSA, 1998, proposed as industry 
best practice is shown in Appendix Figure A-1. 
The basic Maintenance management loop has been illustrated as a superior process in 
the offshore O&G production facilities where products are produced with low HSE 
risks and high production regularity. On an overall level there are input factors called 
resources, processes called management of work processes and outputs named as 
results. This process model served to illustrate the dependencies and interactions 
among diverse set of knowledge areas. In this frame work, outputs from one 
management process become inputs to another in a subsequent hierarchy. We can 
summarize the loop as: 
1. Define resource requirements(organization, material , documentation and IT) 
2. Define corporate goals and objectives clearly 
3. Develop „just-in-time‟ maintenance program to achieve those goals and 
objectives 
4. Plan efficient maintenance program  
5. Execute the maintenance  
6. Asses the technical condition (e.g. using condition monitoring techniques)  
7. Report technical condition results  
8. Analyze the results  
9. Define improvement measurements required to avoid reoccurrences, after 
which the process returns to step 1 to complete the loop.  
1.3 Problem Formulation 
In practice, the choice of the optimum maintenance strategy is not a simple task. 
Implementation of such philosophy for complex installations is a difficult and a 
complex task. Key question to address such challenges should be “What is the 
optimum preventive maintenance time interval?” 
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This thesis focuses on developing an integrated maintenance management framework 
(Figure 1) to establish „just sufficient‟ &„just-in-time‟ maintenance and to ensure 
continuous improvements based on maintenance domain experts as well as 
operational and historic data.  
To establish „just-in-time‟ maintenance true degradation of components must be 
identified. True level of degradation often cannot be inferred by the mere trending of 
condition indicator‟s level (CBM), because condition indicator levels are modulated 
under the influence of the diverse operating context (normal, marginal, hostile, 
operating complexity, etc). Besides, the maintenance domain expert does not have a 
precise knowledge about the correlation of the diverse operating context and level of 
degradation for a given level of condition indicator on specific equipment. Advanced 
software tools, like fuzzy logic, considers these vagueness and imprecise knowledge 
(better than the conventional statistical modeling) to quantify imprecise and uncertain 
information. 
1.4 Main Objectives and Sub-objectives 
1.4.1 Main Objectives 
 To develop a methodology to optimize maintenance performance  
1.4.2  Sub-objectives 
1) To develop effective and efficient maintenance strategy 
2) To identify true component degradation pattern  
3) To explore how to  enhance continues analysis  and improvements 
1.5 Project Activities  
1) Develop integrated maintenance management framework. Develop a 
methodology that establishes a clear link between the identified failure modes 
and maintenance activities. Evaluate generic failure modes and failure 
frequencies of the various equipment groups so as to develop the basis for 
realistic consequence classification. 
2) Assess P-F curves for major equipment groups, identify failure mechanisms 
and develop the condition-monitoring needs linked to failure mechanisms to 
find true degradation. 
3) Propose an analyses model that integrates historical maintenance data as well 
as operational data and provides basis for continuous improvement of 
maintenance programs. Improved root cause analysis of failures, event 
analysis and trends should be clearly linked. 
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1.6 Research Methodology 
An integrated maintenance management framework has been built to establish „just-
in-time‟ maintenance activities to improve potential maintenance performance. The 
factors contributing to improve system performance (HSE, productivity, economy) 
have been discussed using HTO integration. The uncertainty/vagueness related to true 
degradation of components is modeled using expert synthesis of information. To 
reveal the underlying physical, human, machine or latent causes for unwanted event, 
improved Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA) has been used. By learning from these 
underlying causes, proper actions can be taken at the „right time‟ and the right 
measures implemented in order to prevent future  reoccurrences of unwanted related 
events (continues improvements). 
1.7 Research Limitations 
The thesis is based on advanced and complex offshore Oil and Gas production 
facilitates. The study focuses on the basic maintenance management loop developed 
by PSA in 1998 to improve the potential maintenance performance. The developed 
framework is based on basic concepts, and hence efficiency might be limited to some 
extent. Full implementation is not possible because the cost-benefit analysis is not 
done due to limited data, tools and time frame. Cost-benefit analysis is out of scope at 
this stage.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Integrated Maintenance Management 
2.1 Introduction  
Integrating the diverse knowledge across the integrated maintenance management 
frame work increases flexibility and robustness. This integrated framework helps to 
get real time information, which enables to quickly identify events (including hidden 
events) that lead to functional failures. Updates in knowledge can be accommodated 
within the frame work by integrating personnel, technology and the organization. 
Leadership capabilities should be built in all levels to accommodate the updates.  
It is believed that by implementing Expert System tools and methods, such as Fuzzy 
Logic can significantly improve maintenance performance by identifying the true 
degradation of components and performing „just-in-time‟ maintenance and hence 
saving the system from unwanted downtime. The improved RCFA is also another 
input to the integrated maintenance management model to create improvement 
opportunities for the future. 
In the following chapters, detail descriptions and discussions of the different elements 
in the maintenance management process model is given. Those elements where risk 
assessment, use of consequence classification and probability for failure assessment 
are important and are further described in the following sections. 
12 
 
 
Figure 1: integrated maintenance management process model
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2.1.1 Maintenance Inputs/Resources 
To develop efficient and effective integrated maintenance management process, goals 
have to be established clearly that commit the organization to realizable level of 
performance (in long or short period). In general the goals of maintenance 
management focuses on ambition level of; 
 Risk, production and cost 
 Regulatory requirements 
 Technical condition of the facility in particular the performance level of safety 
systems and critical processes 
 Improvement of overall maintenance process 
 Operational efficiency 
To meet these organizational goals optimally, effective use of maintenance resources 
(organization, materials, documentation and IT systems) is a necessity. For this, there 
should be a comprehensive integrated link among these elements. Maintenance 
organization refers to setting up the organizational structure, strategy and human 
power for organizing the work; materials refer to issues regarding purchase, storage 
and usage of the spare parts; and documentation and IT systems refer to collecting, 
processing, storing and disseminating data in the form of information needed to carry 
out the functions of maintenance management.  
For example, a Computer Maintenance Management system (CMMS) helps to 
maintain a computer database of information about an organization‟s maintenance 
operations. This information is intended to help maintenance personnel do their jobs 
more effectively & effectively. 
CMMS facilitates fast access to vital information, quick handling and storage of large 
amount of data and information. It is a tool for maintenance planning and control 
which helps to reduce lead time problems associated with ordering of parts in addition 
to reducing losses associated with downtimes for inspections and repairs. CMMS 
provides „just-in-time‟ maintenance program by monitoring the equipment failure 
rates and histories thereby allowing for effectiveness in coordination of labour and 
spare parts needed for maintenance. This has the effect of minimizing maintenance 
costs (improved cost control) and improving maintenance efficiency.  
As maintenance management is a multi-faceted discipline which includes 
maintenance engineers, accountants, inventory managers, human resource personnel 
and so on, integrating the diverse knowledge across the frame work increases 
flexibility and robustness. This integrated framework helps to get real time 
information, which enables to quickly identify events (including hidden events) that 
lead to functional failures. Updates in knowledge can be accommodated within the 
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frame work by integrating personnel, technology and the organization. (I explain in 
detail about human-technology-organization in section 3) 
A typical CMMS package deals with some or all of the following modules: 
 Equipment identification and bill of materials; 
 Work order management: Manages the opening of a new order, its cost 
estimate and its development. 
 Planning and scheduling: Deals with time for various tasks and resources 
needed. 
 Deals with the material, time and cost requirements of PM. 
 Monitors inventory in store and in use. 
 Provides a record of special events in the equipment life cycle and other 
events like repairs, downtimes, overhauls, labor and cost. 
 Keeps record of individuals, their skills, certifications to cater for the labor 
requirements of maintenance activities. (Gardiner, 2005) 
2.1.2 Maintenance Management Process: Building Leadership Capability 
People are the most important assets of any organization. Most maintenance 
companies focus on improving process and Technology, yet they lack the tools to 
efficiently identify, integrate, and engage the unique talents of their people. 
Competent (with knowledge, skills and attributes) leaders should define roles and 
responsibilities and within the area of maintenance. Leadership capabilities should be 
built at all levels of the maintenance department. They should possess knowledge 
related to risk based maintenance management and make sure that the main work flow 
is followed.  
A set of KPI‟s should be defined for monitoring and follow up performance, and act 
up on deviations from set corporate goals and objectives. Besides the leaders should 
plan and institute audits of the organization, suppliers and contractors. Integrating 
from top to lower level improves to get real time information to solve problems 
quickly. Maintenance strategies for offshore facilities are defined to meet the clearly 
defined set of goals. (See ISO14224 for examples of KPI). The most common KPI‟s 
relevant for offshore maintenance strategies, for example, is discussed below. 
 Technical related maintenance KPI‟s such as: 
> Time used on PM/total maintenance time 
> Time used on unplanned CM/total maintenance time 
> Total planned maintenance time/total maintenance time 
> Waiting time for spare parts/total maintenance time 
> Production down time/total production time 
  KPI‟s comparing actual executed work orders against planned work orders 
(Backlog). This is a good indicator of maintenance work efficiency, but does 
not give indication of how effectively the work  is carried out in planning, 
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execution and follow-up. Deviation in measured performance may be due to 
any of the following factors: 
> Poor planning, wrong work orders 
> Lack of efficiency in execution of work orders 
> Lack of human power 
> Lack of spare parts 
> Too much corrective work in the period and insufficient staff to do the PM 
works. 
 Criticality safety compliance KPI‟s. This gives a confirmation whether the 
required SIL (safety integrity level) is achieved. This KPI implicitly assumes 
that the planned tests are an accurate of system performance and reliability 
without considering the characteristics of the system measured or the risk 
failure. the true performance should include measurement of : 
> maintenance performance 
> Management performance 
 Safety system performance KPI‟s: these KPIs relate to the specific HSE 
critical equipment and systems and for which performance standards be 
defined. The KPIs can be managed as follows: 
> Measurement per safety function group 
> Count of number test failures per HSE equipment 
> Remedial actions are assessed based on system performance. 
> Failure statistics for all safety systems must be compiled on a yearly basis 
to assess development over time, identify bad factors, etc. 
 Organizational maintenance KPI‟s: 
> Number of internal maintenance personnel/total internal employees 
> Planned and scheduled maintenance man hours /total maintenance man 
hours available 
> Internal man-hrs used for continuous improvement/total internal 
maintenance personnel man-hrs. 
> Number of injuries to maintenance personnel/total maintenance personnel 
etc. 
 Economical maintenance KPIs: 
> (Input maintenance cost) total maintenance cost/output maintenance 
> Availability related to maintenance/total maintenance cost 
> Total maintenance cost/asset replacement values etc. 
2.1.3 Output: Technical State (risk level and production regularity) 
The result of „just-in-time‟ maintenance action will give us an improved technical 
condition of the system. (i.e. performance and risk level should be in acceptable limit 
and regularity). The performance of the output measured uses as a feedback to the 
maintenance loop and update the process accordingly. The risk level is a result of the 
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O&M work done to the asset. Risk can be measured as HSE performance, barrier 
reliability status or related indicators. The plant‟s production regularity is a result of 
the activities implemented to achieve and maintain a performance that is at its 
optimum in terms of the overall economy and at the same time consistent with 
applicable framework conditions. An indicator of this would be the achieved 
production availability. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Maintenance Strategy Development 
3.1 Introduction  
Defining maintenance goals and formulating strategies is an important aspect of an 
integrated maintenance management within a company. Pinjala and Pintelon (2004) 
defined maintenance strategy as a series of unified and integrated pattern of decisions 
made in four structural and six infrastructure decision elements to achieve 
maintenance goals.  
According to Pinjala and Pintelon (2004), the four decision elements (maintenance 
capacity, maintenance facilities, maintenance technology, and vertical integration) can 
be viewed as the maintenance resources. They are termed as structural, because 
decisions made in those areas are generally assumed to be fixed. For instance, a 
company outsourcing its entire maintenance activities cannot revert immediately to 
in-house maintenance. The majority of the maintenance budget is consumed by these 
structural elements.  
The six infrastructure elements (maintenance organization; maintenance policy and 
concepts; maintenance planning and control systems; human resources; maintenance 
modifications and maintenance performance measurement and reward systems) can 
be viewed as maintenance management elements.  
These structural and infrastructure elements are interrelated. For instance, effective 
utilization of maintenance resources depends upon the decisions taken in the 
infrastructure elements (Panesar and Markeset, 2006). Over a period of time decisions 
must be made in all of these maintenance strategy elements. The way these elements 
are managed or utilized can have a major impact on the maintenance function‟s ability 
to implement and support the company‟s manufacturing and business strategies. 
Companies mainly differ in their maintenance strategies by the combination of 
decisions taken in these elements. Several operating aspects and business 
requirements influence these decisions. 
The effectiveness of maintenance can be known only if one is able to identify and 
evaluate a given maintenance strategy. An effective maintenance strategy is one that 
fits the needs of the industry. The process of formulating an effective maintenance 
strategy for a company can be a difficult task of quite daunting complexity. 
Furthermore, evaluating such a strategy can be much more complex. For example, 
performing maintenance activities in the offshore oil and gas production facilities is 
quite challenging and highly risky (due to adverse operating environment). 
Even it becomes more difficult, expensive and challenging when it comes to the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf Oil and Gas industry, because many of the fields are 
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located in a deep, remote as well as harsh environments(e.g. Arctic zone). Thus there 
is a requirement of increased focus on developing an integrated maintenance approach 
for effective and efficient maintenance strategies that create value by improving the 
safety, reliability, availability, technical integrity, regularity, quality and functional 
performance of the production facilities.  
3.2 Issues for Developing an Integrated Maintenance Management 
Framework 
The formulation and establishment of an integrated frame work for maintenance 
strategy requires understanding the operational and maintenance objectives; the 
technical and functional system characteristics; the administrative and organizational 
issues; the system functions and performance targets; the internal and external 
resources; the geographical location; statuary requirements; as well as the support 
services(see as an example in Table 1). Therefore, one has to examine the types of 
resources (organization and level of competence (knowledge, skills, attributes, 
motivation)) available. 
Table 1: Issues to be considered in the development of an integrated frame work for a 
maintenance strategy (based on Markeset, 2003) 
Types of issues Examples 
Operational 
objectives 
Customer needs, wants and preferences, production 
objectives, production schedules, plant operating pattern, , 
uptime, availability, etc 
Maintenance 
objectives 
Cost and performance optimization, regulatory requirements, 
etc 
Technical and 
functional system 
characteristics 
Reliability, maintainability, supportability, availability, etc. 
Administration and 
organization 
Maintenance and operational  organization, shift and 
personnel rotation, planning and scheduling, reporting and 
continuous improvements, etc 
Statutory 
requirements 
HSE, standards and regulations 
Geographical 
location 
Infrastructure, culture, political stability, weather conditions, 
etc 
Support services Training,  modifications, upgrading, warranty, expert 
assistance, diagnostics, remote support, etc 
Internal resources Competence level, facilities, tools, and methods, labor costs, 
etc 
External resources Service providers competence and capabilities, availability of 
service provider, support logistics, support quality, etc. 
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In Oil & Gas industry corporate goals of ensuring the highest possible HSE level, 
highest possible production regularity, and highest possible cost effectiveness are the 
three main issues. A comprehensive integrated maintenance program should 
contribute to achieving these goals. Achieving the highest HSE level means that the 
production facilities are operated and maintained in such a manner that HSE risks are 
„eliminated‟ to zero level.  
Optimizing production regularity means that production facilities are operated and 
maintained in such a manner that production up times are optimized and production 
down times minimized (Markeset, 2003). This means to optimize production 
regularity, to ensure optimum capacity utilization, to minimized unplanned shut 
downs, to minimize maintenance interventions and to minimize unplanned 
maintenance works.  
Achieving cost effectiveness means that the resources should be utilized in the best 
possible manner and equipment failures that could cause productions losses or could 
result in high repair/replacement costs should be prevented or reduced to an 
acceptable level(see also NORSOK ZOO8 rev. 2; NORSOK ZO16). HSE, production 
regularity and cost effectiveness therefore, can be considered as the three main 
concerns for development of efficient and effective maintenance strategy.  
An important matter to realize is that these three important issues are interrelated. 
That means no change can be made without affecting the other two issues. For 
instance increasing production up times may affect HSE risk level and/or maintenance 
related cost. Furthermore, one needs to realize that to optimize maintenance 
performance, one need to optimize and integrate the technological, organizational and 
the human performance to quickly identify the underlying root cause for the failures 
(i.e. human error, organizational or technical error). Therefore these (also depicted in 
Figure 2) are also the key issues to be considered when one needs to develop efficient 
and effective maintenance strategies. Integrating personnel, technology and 
organization optimizes our decision capabilities, and hence improves maintenance 
performance.  
3.3 Human-Technology -Organization (HTO) Integration 
The aim of HTO integration is to increase maintenance performance (innovative 
performance, efficiency, effectiveness, employee satisfaction etc) and to get real time 
information to quickly identify the underlying cause for failures to solve problems. 
Human-technology-organization integrated approach gives a chance where to create a 
better value for the organization. The objective is to create a work situation which 
contributes as much as possible to realizing efficient and safe operations, and which 
takes into account people's capabilities, limitations and needs. Even the most 
sophisticated technologies, when designed and implemented without proper 
consideration of user needs and requirements, may not achieve optimal maintenance 
performance.  
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 Figure 2: Integration of human-technology-organization to improve maintenance 
performance 
Integrated socio-technical consideration ensures full functionality and fail-safe 
system. Comprehensive overview enables to overcome unforeseen events that might 
lead to total collapse of the complex production facility (Liyanage and Eirik, 2010). 
This integration will specially help to manage complex and high risk assets like O&G 
industries. Over the last couple of years, several serious incidents have highlighted the 
connections between factors which are important to both a good working environment 
and operational safety (PSA, 2010). Increased knowledge of the interaction among 
technical, organizational elements and the people using these is, therefore, critical in 
understanding the underlying causes of incidents (i.e. human, technical or 
organizational error). 
Human factors (HFs) knowledge provides a basis for deeper understanding of what 
causes human errors. However, in a statistical sense, human errors are predictable, 
and may also be caused by a number of factors outside the control of the individual. 
Focusing on human errors gives an opportunity to develop and improve system 
performances. For instance, we can make a system to be able to handle errors by 
taking human capabilities and limitations into account when designing equipment and 
technology. Therefore, it is critical to maintain an inclusive focus on factors which 
influence human behavior.   
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In this HTO integration approach to facilitate the avoidance of human error, the most 
important aspect is to keep in mind that people are rational, dynamic, solve problems, 
make systems which are more robust and flexible and that they are irreplaceable in 
many systems. If we do this, we will contribute to creating the best environment for 
improving the potential maintenance performance.  
In modification projects, for instance, which involve installation of new equipment, it 
is important to have a clear understanding of the entire work situation, and consider 
the combined mass of equipment as one system to create conducive environment for 
maintenance activities. Complex and safety-critical activities will always depend on 
human actions, which are the precondition for better decision makings, safe 
operations and handling of unplanned failures. Even though people may make errors, 
the people in the system are more advantageous, as humans are rational and 
adaptable.  
The competence (knowledge, skill, attributes, motivation, etc) of managers and 
employees, as well as their ability to improve, are thus critical in re-establishing a safe 
condition following an unexpected course of events (maintenance activities). There is, 
therefore, a clear connection between factors which are important for both a good 
working environment and maintenance operational safety. Increasing knowledge of 
the interaction among human, technology and organization (HTO) - is therefore 
essential to understanding the underlying causes of incidents, and for optimized 
maintenance in the integrated maintenance management.  
The biggest challenge in adoption a new technology is the mindset of managers and 
their attitude. Technology is viewed as physical asset (mechanistic dimension, while 
disregarding or attempting to eliminate the human side. In this view, it is to reduce 
reliance on human inputs (both the quantity of labor and variance (errors)). Due to 
this sophistication in maintenance technology appears to be under-utilized.  
Organizational change to keep a pace with the technological change is another 
challenge. The current operational setting and functional characteristics are still not 
fully fail-safe assured nor perfect in all senses. It obviously has brought a number of 
issues to be seriously considered further, for example, new forms of partnerships for 
cooperation, shared responsibilities and roles, contract redesign, risk-gain sharing 
schemas, security and reliability of infrastructures, etc., that are important to ensure 
fully-functional fail-safe activities.  
The biggest concern therefore is that the accelerated change triggered by the miracle 
of the technology and the success of technology implementation efforts may easily 
undermine the hidden problems, where ill-defined interfaces and increasing 
complexities of systems and data solutions can lead to unforeseen events which lead 
to high consequences. It implies that complex interfaces of the emerging socio-
technical system need serious considerations to avoid maintenance hazardous 
incidents with heavy losses.  
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The underlying issue here is that the current development trends, which have 
substantial faith on pure technological solutions (technical dimension of technology), 
can easily over calculate human and organizational capacities and limitations.  
In fact in most cases human and organizational aspects are seen largely deviated from 
main-stream change and thus the pace of development of sub disciplines take place at 
different rates and scales. Since this setting can directly contribute to various levels 
and forms of complexities within an integrated maintenance environment, the E&P 
industry, for example,  has begun to look relatively more seriously on a development 
path that will contribute to establish a more harmonized socio-technical setting 
(Liyanage and Eirik, 2010). Therefore human should be viewed as central part of the 
maintenance management system. Human factors consideration should be integrated 
throughout the life cycle of maintenance management system development.   
By specifying and designing the system to accommodate human capabilities and 
limitations, we can improve maintenance performance.  
The emerging socio-technical-organizational system in the Oil and Gas industry, as a 
consequence of systematic growth towards integrated maintenance approach, is in fact 
seen very complex. It involves different levels in the socio-political hierarchy, ranging 
from policy levels to more maintenance operational levels. It also involves different 
maintenance organizations that need to play active roles in implementation of techno-
managerial solutions (e.g. technology experts, maintenance service providers, asset 
operators, service providers, etc.) (Liyanage and Eirik, 2010). The nature of vertical 
and/or horizontal interactivity between those different sources is a defining factor of 
the future of integrated maintenance operations.  
Despite the obvious complexity of the emerging setting, there still is an absence of a 
comprehensive overview and a deeper insight into the sensitive interfaces that is 
critical to mitigate operational risk. Liyanage and Eirik (2010) argue that the very 
socio-political level acts, rules, regulations, and guidelines represent important 
components to establish a well-defined top-down interface.  
Even though there is a vacuum in that respect between the policy-making and 
operational levels of the emerging system, the change processes at the operational 
level takes place regardless. Systematic integration of human, technology, 
organizations, and work processes are the basis to improve/optimize maintenance 
activities. In fact the effects of such explicit or implicit integration is very synergistic, 
and has begun to place numerous demands on the need for more clear guidelines, 
procedures, recommendations, references etc. to help reducing the operational risk 
exposure.  
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3.4 Development Process of Effective and Efficient Maintenance 
Strategy  
By integrating the diverse knowledge areas and different issues, an effective and 
efficient maintenance strategy can be developed. Figure 3 illustrates a process for 
maintenance strategy development (Panesar et al., 2008). According to Panesar et al 
(2008) two engineering companies follow this process when developing maintenance 
strategy for O&G operator companies active on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. In 
addition to that different NORSOK standards are used. Such as Z008 rev. 2-
Critacallity Analysis for Maintenance Purposes, Z013-Risks and Emergency 
Preparedness Analysis, Z016-Regularity Maintenance and Reliability Technology, 
Z002-Coding System and DNV RP G-101-Risk Based Inspection, etc. both the 
engineering companies extract production facilities equipment data from CMMS of 
the operator companies.  
The process starts with extensive collecting data, information and documentation 
from asset maintenance logs, history records, and experts about offshore productions 
facilities and then followed by developing technical and functional hierarchy.  
Criticality analysis (also known as Consequence classification) is then done with 
respect to overall company requirements (HSE, production regularity and economics 
consequences) (Panesar et al, 2008).  The consequence classification is done to set up 
priority of maintenance activities while developing „just sufficient‟ and „just-in-time‟ 
maintenance program, to specify common spare part strategy for equipment of equal 
importance, to decide the extent and quality of technical documentation as well as to 
decide the priority of corrective maintenance activities . 
Here the uncertainty with respect to prioritize the maintenance activity is improved 
my increasing our knowledge to understand the interaction among the technical, 
organizational and the people. This helps to quickly look the underlying causes for 
incidents (human error, organizational or technical) and improve our decision making 
to make „just-in-time‟ maintenance. This is done by integrating human-technology-
organization. 
The consequence classification is done based on analysis of functional failure 
consequences. Very high consequence requires a RCM approach or redesign to avoid 
failure. Safety systems are also redesigned if failures are classified as highly critical. 
Failures of sub-systems which have less serious failure consequences are classified in 
the low criticality category. For these systems one defines planned corrective or first 
line maintenance activities.  
For systems in which failures have medium or high consequences one first screens 
and then after analyses using for example FMECA, or fuzzy logic, methodology to 
identify failure modes, failure effect, potential mitigating activities etc (Panesar et al, 
2008). In chapter 4, I try to show, with an example, the advantage of fuzzy logic to 
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improve the traditional FMECA methodology to prioritize maintenance activities in a 
better way. Discussion of main parts of the process model for the development of 
efficient & effective maintenance strategy is made in the following sections. 
 
            Figure 3: maintenance strategy development process (adapted from Kumar and Markeset, 2005) 
*: the shortcoming of FMEA [based on RPN analysis] is that various sets of failure 
Occurrence probability [Pf,], severity [S] and detestability [Pd] may produce an identical 
value, however, the risk implication may be totally different which may result in high-risk 
events may go unnoticed. The other drawback is that it neglects the relative importance 
among Pf, S and Pd. To address these shortcomings related to traditional FMEA, tools such 
as a fuzzy logic theory, with gearbox as an example is provided in chap. 4 to prioritize the 
failure causes. 
3.4.1 Technical and Functional Hierarchy to Develop an Efficient and Effective 
Maintenance Strategy 
To develop an efficient and effective maintenance strategy, it is important to develop 
a functional and technical hierarchy for each sub-system/component. NORSOK Z008 
& Z0016 recommend that the complex and advanced production facilities can be 
divided in to technical and functional hierarchy for conducting maintenance analysis. 
In this section a detail description (using as an example) will be given to show the 
technical hierarchy and how this is connected to the functional hierarchy which is 
used for consequence classification. The technical hierarchy is established at an early 
phase to give an overview of all the tags/equipments and how they are related.  
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The technical hierarchy describes the technical structure of the installation. The 
hierarchy provides an overview of equipment units that belong together technically, 
and shows the physical relationship between main equipment, instruments, valves, 
etc. for example, a lube oil pump will be placed under lube oil tank and the motor is 
placed under the pump. Other technically connected equipment, for example heating 
element and filter are placed at the same level as the pump or under a corresponding 
package tag.  
The functional hierarchy is a logical diagram linking all the complex production 
facility functions noted as main functions (MF) and sub functions. Each system is 
split into main functions, for example power generation, heat exchange, pumping etc. 
the main functions are split in to sub-functions based on the function performed by 
each component. At the component level the function could be process shutdown, 
equipment shutdown, indication, alarm, etc, the components, based on their functional 
hierarchy, are placed on various hierarchal levels.  
The level on which the maintenance objects are established is governed by practical 
execution and the individual need to monitor and control the different maintenance 
programs. For corrective maintenance where the work orders can be assigned to any 
tagged equipment, the cost will be traceable to a lower level, but even this costing 
should be possible to summarize to the same level as for the maintenance objects used 
for the preventive maintenance programs.  
This information is a part of the data needed to perform an evaluation and 
optimization of the maintenance strategy. If the data is linked to the lowest level, the 
hierarchy will make it possible to summarize this information to the appropriate level, 
which could be the maintenance object or MF as shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: illustration of the link between functional and technical hierarchy (NORSOK Z008 
rev. 3) 
3.4.2 Consequence Analysis for Prioritizing Maintenance  
A Consequence classification of the whole system is made with respect to the 
maintenance of failure of any of the functions on the three main concerns (i.e. HSE, 
production regularity and economics).  
This classification is to underscore what effect a functional failure can have on HSE, 
production and economics. This classification together with the other key information 
and parameters (HTO and RCFA) gives input to the following activities and 
processes: 
 Selection of equipment where detailed RCM/RBI/FMECA analysis is 
recommended 
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 Establish preventive maintenance programme (time/age/condition based) 
 Preparation and optimization of GMCs 
 Design evaluations 
 Prioritization of work orders 
 Spare part evaluations  
Figure5 below shows the overall work flow related to classification 
 The functional classification is done to identify safety critical functional 
failures and link tags to this function 
 All systems and/components related to an installation should be classified 
using the same classification scale 
 The classification feeds in to a common risk model used for operational 
decision making as a result they need to be similar. 
 The containment function consisting of pipes, vessels, valves are normally 
consequence classified via and RBI analysis. The containment has a dual 
function, i.e. safety system with a performance standard and a production 
system with its production functions. Equipment with a containment function 
has two inputs in to the classification process as illustrated in the Figure 5 
 Safety critical systems are defined via safety analysis (e.g. QRA) in the design 
or amendment process. As such these systems are already identified and its 
function defined. 
 The outcome of the classification will be a set of attributes assigned to each 
component tag. The set of parameters should be aligned to the decision model. 
Examples of information to be assigned to each component tag are: 
> Safety function indicator 
> Leakage HSE consequence 
> HSE functional failure consequence 
> Production consequence 
> Cost consequence  
> Redundancy 
28 
 
 
Figure 5: consequence classification process (source: NORSOK-Z008, rev. 3) 
In developing effective and efficient maintenance strategy, it is important to clearly 
identify, define and document the systems/equipments with their boundaries by the 
use of the engineering numbering system. Selection criteria could be based on 
maintenance cost, main contributors to functional failure/unavailability and safety 
related incidents. For the consequence analysis which assesses the consequences of 
failures and the degree of functional redundancy, the consequence classes have to be 
properly defined prior to performance of the analysis.  
The definition of the consequence classes must be done in accordance with overall 
company criteria for safety and environment, and reflect the actual plant operation 
when it comes to functional failures. To classify the most serious effect of functional 
failures, the consequence classes defined in Table 2 is applied, unless otherwise 
specified. Note that the loss of functional failure should in monetary value comply 
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with the corresponding cost limits specified for „Cost‟ within each class. (NORSOK-
Z008) 
 
Table 2: General consequence classification (NORSOK-Z008 rev. 2) 
 
Class 
Health, safety and 
environment (HSE) 
Production 
 
Cost (exclusive 
production loss) 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
Potential for serious personnel 
injuries. Render safety critical 
systems inoperable. 
Potential for fire in classified 
areas‟ Potential for large 
pollution. 
Stop in 
production/signific
ant 
reduced rate of 
production 
Exceeding X hours 
(specify duration) 
within a defined 
period of time. 
 
Substantial cost 
- exceeding Y 
NOK 
(specify cost 
limit) 
 
 
 
 
Med. 
 
Potential for injuries requiring 
medical treatment. Limited 
effect on safety systems. No 
potential for fire in classified 
areas. Potential for moderate 
pollution. 
Brief stop in 
production/ 
reduced rate of 
production lasting 
less than X hours 
(specify duration) 
within a defined 
period of time. 
 
Moderate cost 
between Z- Y 
NOK (specify 
cost limits) 
 
 
Low 
No potential for injuries. No 
potential for fire or effect on 
safety systems. No potential for 
pollution (specify limit) 
No effect on 
production within a 
defined period of 
time. 
 
Insignificant cost 
less than Z NOK 
(specify cost 
limit) 
 
 
Loss of „Containment “for example, i.e. external leakage, requires a separate 
evaluation to reflect best practice for inspection planning. This applies for 
consequences to HSE while the consequences to production loss and other costs are 
similar for all kinds of failures. Table 3 gives guidelines for assessment of the 
consequences to workers safety, while the consequences to the external environment 
differ significantly depending on the chemical composition of the released substance, 
volume and the recipients (open sea, shore, earth or atmosphere). The consequence 
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classification related to containment is proposed as a prioritization of static 
mechanical equipment for establishing an inspection program. 
 
Table 3: Consequence classification for containment (NORSOK-Z008 rev. 2) 
Class Health, safety and environment 
(HSE) 
Production 
 
Cost (exclusive 
production loss) 
 
 
 
High 
 
When substance is: 
• Hydrocarbons (highly ignitable gases 
and un stabilized oil) and other 
flammable media. 
• Liquid/steam, exceeding 50 ºC or 
10bar. 
• Toxic gas and fluids. 
As for 
production, 
class „High‟ 
in 
Table 2. 
 
As for cost, class 
„High‟ in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
Med. 
 
When substance is: 
• Stabilized oil, diesel and other less 
ignitable gases and fluids. 
• Liquid/steam, less than 50 ºC and 10 
bar 
• Toxic substance, small volume. 
• Diesel 
As for 
Production, 
class 
„Medium‟ in 
Table 2. 
 
Moderate cost b/n 
Z–YNOK(specify 
cost limits) 
 
 
 
Low 
When substance is: 
• Non-ignitable media. 
• Atmospheric gasses and fluids 
harmless to humans and environment. 
• Negligible toxic effects. 
As for 
production, 
class „Low‟ 
in 
Table 2. 
 
As for cost, class 
„Low‟ in Table 2. 
 
 
In Offshore Oil & Gas industries, the production facility is usually complex and is 
divided into a number of main functions covering the entire system, such as heat 
exchanging, pumping, separation, power generation, compressing, distributing, 
storing, etc. Each MF is given a unique designation consisting of a number (if 
appropriate a tag number) and a name that describes the task and the process. A 
comprehensive integrated assessment for each main function helps in developing 
effective and efficient maintenance strategy.  
As an example, main function (MF) redundancy grade assessment of all the 
equipment is specified in a with respect to loss according to Table 2&3. The level of 
redundancy within one MF is classified by the codes as in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Classification of redundancy 
Redundancy Redundancy degree definition 
A No redundancy i.e. the entire MF is required to avoid any loss of 
function(no unit can fail without disturbing the MF) 
B One parallel unit can suffer a fault without influencing the function. 
C Two or more parallel units can suffer a fault at the same time without 
influencing the function. 
 
Assessing the consequences of the most serious faults preferably is carried out by 
experts with experience in risk and reliability evaluations in collaboration with 
personnel experienced in operations and maintenance and with sound understanding 
of the production process and the technical equipment. The entire MF is assessed in 
terms of the most serious effect of a fault. In this assessment any redundancy within 
the function is disregarded, as the redundancy will be treated separately. 
With this approach, the most serious effect of a fault be identified and the influence 
on the performance of the MF can be quantified according to Table 2. The optimal 
time from the fault occurring, until it affects the system/plant functional performance 
be estimated, see Table 3, column for ‟Production‟. When the fault affects more than 
one of the categories (HSE, production and cost), this is identified and described so 
that it is evident from the text how the effect takes place. 
 Based on the consequence and redundancy grade assessment, a matrix can be 
developed. See Table 5. 
Table 5: Criticality and Redundancy Matrix (H=high; M=medium; L=low) 
HA HB HC 
MA MB MC 
LA LB LC 
 
The criticality and redundancy matrix gives a classification of component/equipment 
in various groups and helps the decision makers to decide the most efficient 
maintenance strategy for the component/equipment in these groups. The equipment 
that falls in the high criticality-redundancy group (HA) is generally recommended for 
RCM actions or the product need to be redesigned/ modified to reduce the risk with 
respect to cost and production loss. The equipment that falls in the medium criticality-
redundancy group (LA, HC, MA) is generally recommended for planned corrective 
maintenance activities or to follow the maintenance activities recommended by the 
OEM supplier. Safety criticality equipment is always considered of very high 
criticality (based on NORSOK Z008 rev. 2) 
Moreover, for deciding the most effective and efficient maintenance strategy for 
components, maintenance concepts are developed. The basic principle for 
maintenance concepts is to group similar equipment, operating in similar conditions, 
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for conducting similar maintenance activities. In other words, the maintenance 
concepts enable standardizing maintenance activities for equipment with the same 
criticality and operating in similar conditions. The maintenance concepts also take in 
to account the corporate strategy to facilitate inclusion of operator and maintenance 
personnel‟s experience, supplier recommendations, historical data, company/authority 
regulations, etc. 
A criticality based maintenance analysis enables to define and prioritize maintenance 
activities, the resources required, the spare parts required, etc. and to develop „just-in-
time‟ maintenance programs for the complex productions facility. The maintenance 
activities at the component level are uploaded in the CMMS of an O&G operator 
company for generation of work orders 
In order to simplify the consequence assessment and enable work to be carried out 
with sufficient accuracy with minimum use of resources, the sub function level can be 
‟standardized„.(See Appendix B).  
3.5 Maintenance program 
Failure modes, failure mechanisms and failure cause that can have a significant effect 
on HSE and production and cost will be identified and the risk determined. Taking 
compressor as an example, the failure modes could be: failure to start on demand, to 
stop on demand, high output, low output, external/internal leakage, vibration, noise, 
overheating, plugged/choked, parameter deviation and tec. The failure mechanism 
could be: mechanical, material, instrumental, electrical, external failures and etc. these 
have to be in to further details.  
For example, material failure could be detailed further as; cavitations, corrosion, 
erosion, breakage, wear, fatigue etc. failure cause could be: design-related causes; 
fabrication/installation-related causes; failure related to operation/maintenance; failure 
related to management and others. 
The classical way of establishing a maintenance program is using RCM analysis. 
However, this standard calls for using generic maintenance concepts in combination 
with more detailed RCM methods. It is important that the generic concepts are 
adjusted to local operational conditions, for example, Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(NCS) as well as the local risks associated with the advanced, complex production 
facilities. (Look, for instance, Appendix C, maintenance program as recommended by 
NORSOK-Z008)  
The most common effective and efficient methods to establish maintenance program 
are briefly described in the following sections. 
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3.5.1 Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)  
RCM is a process of systematically analyzing a system to understand: 
 Its functions(i.e. the focus is on functional failures not equipment failures) 
 The failure modes and failure effects and failure causes of its equipment 
that support these functions 
 How to choose an optimal maintenance to prevent the failure modes from 
occurring or to detect the failure mode before failure occurs (true condition 
monitoring) 
The objective of Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is to achieve highest 
reliability for all of the operating modes of a system. All results and decisions are 
logged during the RCM process so that results can be re-evaluated later. The result 
will be an effective system to ensure reliable and safe operation of an engineered 
system. The standard IEC 60300-3-11/7/ describes in detail how to perform an RCM 
analysis.  
3.5.2 Risk Based Inspection (RBI) 
RBI techniques have been applied for developing preventive maintenance (PM) 
program for containment functions. The methodology is developed by DNV.  Doing 
an RBI analysis involves assigning probability and consequences to all important 
failure modes within the containment functions as well as setting risk reduction 
measures in the form of inspection, maintenance and condition monitoring. (See sec. 
3.6.1 for details on risk assessment) 
3.5.3 Generic maintenance concept (GMC) 
According to NORSOK-Z008 rev.3, a generic maintenance concept is a set of 
maintenance actions, which demonstrates a cost efficient maintenance method for a 
defined generic group of equipment functioning under similar frame and operating 
conditions. The use of the generic maintenance concept ensures that all defined HSE, 
production, economics and other operating requirements are met. The concept 
includes relevant design and adverse operating environments (normal, marginal, 
hostile). Appropriate performance indicators and the corresponding acceptance 
criteria are defined for safety critical functions. 
NORSOK-Z008 rev. 3 recommends generic maintenance concepts in order to: 
 Reduce the effort in establishing the „just-in-time‟ maintenance program. 
 Ensure uniform and consistent maintenance activities. 
 Facilitate analysis of component/equipment groups. 
 Provide proper documentation of selected effective maintenance strategies. 
A generic maintenance concept may be utilized when: 
 The group of components has similar designs. 
 The components have similar failure modes and failure frequencies. 
 The amount of similar equipment justifies a generic concept. 
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3.5.4 Update Maintenance Program 
As the aim is to improve potential maintenance performance, a maintenance program 
needs updating at intervals. The indicators for such updating could be: 
 The observed failure rate (e.g. based on observable parameters based on 
condition monitoring) is significantly different from what was expected, i.e. 
higher failure rate./lower failure rate is observed requiring a change in 
maintenance strategy  
 The complex operational context has changed causing different consequence 
and failure rate; 
 Cost of maintenance different from expected  
 New technology that could make the maintenance more efficient( CBM 
technologies) is available 
 Updated rules and regulations 
 Information from original equipment manufacturer(OEM) 
The evaluation is based on historical data and best practices and expert‟s 
recommendations. A process diagram model, to update a MP for example, is shown in 
the Figure 6 below. If it is a safety system, an evaluation of number of failures per 
tests and performance standard requirements is performed. If there is a significant 
change in the safety system stated in the performance standard (PS), this information 
is used back to the overall risk assessment for the plant. For non-safety systems a cost 
benefit analysis based on best practices and personnel recommendations is performed. 
Based on this evaluation maintenance program and GMC is updated, and 
implemented in the maintenance plan to improve maintenance performance.  
 
 
Figure 6: work processes for updating maintenance programs (NORSOK-Z008 rev. 3) 
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3.6 Maintenance Planning 
An overall plan has to be prepared for the advanced offshore production facilities for 
the conduct of „just-in-time‟ maintenance program .The results from the criticality 
analysis classification are useful when defining criteria for prioritizing work orders. 
Prioritization of maintenance (using FMECA or Fuzzy Logic) should be done based 
on the risk the failure represents, described as consequence and failure 
impact/probability of failure. Continues improvements on accurate planning can be 
made by getting updated inputs from improved root cause failure analysis and human-
technology-organization (HTO) integration.(Look also Appendix C, prioritization of 
corrective maintenance recommended by NORSKO-Z008 rev. 3, based on the risk the 
failure represents, described as consequence and failure impact). Criticality of failures 
can be classified based on Table 6. 
Table 6: Failure impact scale (adapted from NORSOK Z008 rev. 2) 
Term Definition  Note  
 
 
Failure impact 
Impact of failure of equipment‟s 
function(s) or on the production 
facility plant 
On equipment level, failure 
impact can be classified in 
three classes (critical, 
degraded, incipient) 
 
 
 
Critical failure 
Failure of an equipment plant unit 
which causes an immediate 
cessation of the ability to perform 
a required function. 
Includes failures requiring 
immediate action towards 
cessation of performing the 
function even though actual 
operation may continue for a 
short period of time. A 
critical failure results in an 
unscheduled repair. 
 
 
 
 
Degraded failure 
Failure that does not cease the 
fundamental function(s), but 
compromises one or several 
functions 
The failure may be gradual, 
partial or both. The function 
may be compromised by any 
combination of reduced, 
increased or erratic outputs. 
An immediate repair can 
normally be delayed, but in 
time such failures may be 
developed into a critical 
failure if corrective actions 
are not taken 
 
 
Incipient failure 
Imperfection in the state or 
condition of an item so that a 
degraded or critical failure 
may/may not eventually be the 
expected result if corrective 
actions are not taken 
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3.6.1 Risk Assessment Criteria 
An example of risk decision matrix (based on DNV, 2009) is shown below (Table 7) 
for use in consequence classification, maintenance planning, inspection planning and 
for prioritizing work orders. It uses three classes for consequences (C1, C2, C3), four 
classes for probability (frequency) and four classes for risk (H: high; M: medium; L: 
low; VL: very low) 
The risk for decision making is as important as the risk scale. An example table 8 
below shows a set of criteria for prioritizing time to repair connected to complete 
repair and the mean time to failure (MTTF) 
Table 7: example of priority to repair based on risk 
risk Priority/time to repair Comment 
     H 5days Always highest priority for functional 
failure 
M 60days  
 L 200days  
VL 365days  
 
Table 8: example of Risk matrix used for consequence classification and for decisions 
(modified from DNV, 2009) 
 
 
Loss of 
function 
leading 
to: 
Personnel 
consequences 
No 
injuries 
Minor 
injuries 
Injuries 
with 
absence 
Serious 
injuries 
Fatality  
HC release to 
environment 
<1 tons 1-10 
tons  
10-100 
tons  
100-
1000 
tons 
>1000 
tons 
Production 
loss 
 
0.1mill$ 
 
0.3mill 
$ 
 
1 mill $ 
 
3 mill $ 
 
>10 
mill$ 
Frequency 
per yea 
 
MTBF(year)  
 
Risk/priority time 
>1 0-1 L/6m M/1m H/1w H/1w H/* 
1-0.3 1-3 L/1y L/6m M/1m H/1w H/* 
0.3-0.1 3-10 VL/2y L/1y M/6m H/1w H/1w 
<0.1 Long  VL/3y VL/2y L/1y M/1m H/1w 
*): special considerations, w: week; m: month; y: year 
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The decision criteria for what to do is in the form of a time period until the case is 
repaired or brought back to original function. Some criteria may apply: 
 For safety related barrier equipment, the priority must in any case be high as 
function of these systems is fundamental for operation. Usually a time to 
repair is in the order of one week. In the mean time, risk reducing measures 
can be instituted 
 The risk associated with a full functional failure is determined by the 
consequence only as probability 1. The upper part of the matrix then be 
appropriate. 
 For cases where the notification is related to starting degradation (incipient or 
degraded failure impact) the time to full functional failure has be assigned. 
The time to repair should be smaller than the time to failure. The safety factor 
may be used till repair, but for low consequences, 80% of time to failure 
(TTF) can be used. 
 The priority times in Table 8 point to different times to repair depending on 
the combination of consequence and probability. The matrix is basically 
developed by means of the formula; time=f(consequence)*TTF. For 
simplicity, one set of times vs., risk can also be used, like High=1week, 
Medium=1month, Low=6months, and Very Low=1year 
 Practical aspects like access to the systems, availability of spare parts and 
tools and personnel should not have, in principle, influence on the priority 
(integrating the organizational strategy, logistics and materials help optimize 
to the resource utilization). These factors will obviously play a role in the 
practical planning, and will affect the actual time to finalize the work. But the 
assigned risk and priority must remain the same. 
 The process for identifying priority be implemented in the integrated 
maintenance management system, i.e. default priority with due date is set 
when creating a failure report/notification. The priority for offshore production 
facilities is possible to change due to e.g. adverse operational information on 
the actual failure mode. If the priority is changed, a reason for the change 
should be documented. This is done by using improved root cause failure 
analysis (RCFA) techniques. 
The actual maintenance work can be organized in two ways. 
 As daily activity using permanent employees  
 As maintenance campaigns where the maintenance activities are performed by 
dedicated team which may specialize and cover maintenance activities for 
several plants. 
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Experience has shown that about 50% of the corrective work may not be done 
immediately and are suited for the campaign team (DNV, 2009). Extensive use of 
integrated operations (IOs) technology can make this process effective and efficient. 
The day-to-day workers will do work that need immediate attention, like corrective 
work for safety critical equipments. This set up has many companies shown to be a 
cost effective method to perform the required maintenance tasks. (Refer also 
Appendix E for reporting recommendations by ISO 14224) 
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CHAPTER 4 
Optimization of Maintenance Interval 
4.1 Optimization of Maintenance Activities 
By identifying the root cause for the failure, achieving the desired system 
performance, e.g. reliability, availability, is determined in system design and 
development, but also through implementation of efficient and effective maintenance 
strategies. The overall objective of maintenance process is to increase the profitability 
of the business in a total life cycle cost (LCC) perspective without compromising 
HSE. As indicated in the Figure 7 below, the life of a project is extended by 
improving maintenance performance. Optimization of maintenance strategies is 
therefore expected to provide a basis for development of cost effective maintenance 
strategies which minimizes the consequences related to HSE and economy.  
There are different types of maintenance, of which the main types are preventive 
maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM). Furthermore PM can be 
grouped in to two. 
a) Age/time/condition based; and 
b) Opportunistic based 
 
Figure 7: enhancing revenue through optimizing maintenance 
The specific nature of the maintenance requirements depends on the nature and 
function of the systems/subsystem/equipments and the external environmental 
conditions, and should be balanced towards requirements of reliability (availability).  
Condition-monitoring is already an integral part of the condition-based maintenance 
(CBM) strategy of existing onshore production facilities and is assumed to be cost-
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effective for offshore production facilities, due to higher loss of revenue, longer 
downtimes (due to harsh weather and long transport distance), and larger, heavier and 
more costly components for larger capacity rated facilities.  
Access to the offshore is limited, and most of the maintenance activities have to be 
conducted from May to September. This implies that use of condition-monitoring 
techniques, implemented with fault detection systems (FDS), will be even more 
important for remote offshore production facilities than for onshore. If potential 
failures are detected early enough, it is possible to plan for the maintenance action 
when the component is still on uptime. However, due to the limited window of 
opportunity for doing maintenance on the (remote) offshore, planning ahead implies a 
rather long time horizon. When deterioration and faults are detected during the 
summer season, decisions have to be made whether to replace and repair immediately, 
or wait until next summer. 
A key question for researchers concerned with preventive maintenance for offshore 
facilities, for example, is then “What is the optimum preventive maintenance time 
interval?” Too short intervals would lead to unnecessary prevention costs; no 
preventive maintenance would lead to breakdowns, which may affect production, and 
impose money losses on the firm as discussed previously; and too long intervals 
would result inconveniences, as they will involve preventive maintenance actions and 
would lead to uncontrolled breakdowns. 
 
In order to exploit the information from condition monitoring into maintenance 
decision making, it is necessary to establish a relationship between the state of the 
item (or system) and one, or more, condition-monitored state variables, denoted by 
say, X(t). The relationship between the state of the item and X(t) can be determined 
by using mathematical models or expert judgments to predict the behavior of the 
deterioration process. It is often of interest to find the probability of failure based on 
the value of the condition-monitored state variables, X(t).  
Different subsystems and components will have different deterioration processes and 
measures, depending on their construction, materials, usage, and exposure to external 
adverse conditions. Deterioration may be modeled based on physics of failure and 
characteristics of the operating environment; i.e., modeling deterioration in terms of a 
time-dependent stochastic process. Relevant models are, for example, the P-F interval 
(Moubray, 1997), proportional hazard modeling (PHM)-which is multivariate 
regression analysis and Markov-processes. Since, the operation of (deep-sea) offshore 
implies condition-based maintenance strategies and temporal variability of 
deterioration, stochastic process models, such as Markov processes, may be more 
applicable. 
On the NCS the maintenance programs are developed and maintenance activities 
prioritized based on the coarse consequence classification of equipment (NORSOK 
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Z008 rev.2). This approach does not take into account individual failure modes of the 
equipment. To achieve the ambition of achieving highest production regularity and 
zero damages to HSE due to equipment failures, it will be necessary to perform the 
maintenance activities that prevent(or minimize the probability of occurrences) 
unexpected equipment failures.  
Furthermore, the frequency of conduct of maintenance activities has to be linked to 
realistic mean time between failures. Moreover, functionality and performance 
degradation of the equipment has to be monitored in a manner that sufficient time is 
available for the maintenance managers to plan and organize selected maintenance 
activity execution. This implies that for selected equipment a detailed analyses needs 
to be conducted at the equipment level to develop optimized maintenance strategies. 
In practice, the choice of the optimum maintenance strategy is not a simple task. 
Implementation of such philosophy for complex installations is a difficult and a 
complex task. This thesis focuses on developing integrated maintenance framework to 
implement more effective work processes to develop optimized maintenance 
strategies and to ensure continuous improvements in maintenance strategies based on 
maintenance as well as operational historic data.    
4.2 Concept of Maintenance Optimization-mathematical approach 
 Cost of maintenance is weighted against the cost of the expected failures (DNV, 
2009) 
   
=total expected cost per unit time 
=total cost of maintenance activities 
=interval between maintenance activities 
=frequency of “qualitative consequence” 
 =the number of “qualitative consequence” 
=the expected cost of the “qualitative consequence” 
After we estimate the total cost, the economic optimal maintenance interval (see 
figure 9 below) can be found by:   
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Figure 8: maintenance optimization 
Optimizing costs related to maintenance (see Figure 8 above) may be related to the 
production facility subsystem‟s or component‟s effective failure rate, as a function of 
the inspection intervals and the threshold values.  For (deep) offshore facilities, the 
window for performing inspections and maintenance will be limited and it will be 
difficult to inspect some equipment during long time periods of a year. Thus, 
opportunistic maintenance may be economically practicable. 
Operation and maintenance cost elements consist of operation costs, preventive 
maintenance (PM) costs, and corrective maintenance (CM) costs. The operation costs 
are related to scheduling site people, monitoring overall operation (e.g. through 
SCADA), responding to component fault events, etc. Preventive maintenance (PM) 
costs include periodic inspections of the equipment, oil and filter changes, calibration 
of sensors, and replacement of consumables, such as seals and brake pads. The 
frequency of the PM tasks is usually recommended by the OEM supplier.  
The direct costs related to corrective maintenance are associated with the labor and 
equipment required to repair and replace, component costs. Indirect costs are due to 
lost revenue due to system downtime. The downtime depends on the repair time, 
including detection, getting access to the components, diagnosis, labor and spare part 
mobilization, and weather conditions. Costs of major overhauls and major component 
replacement over the life of components constitute an additional cost element. Figure 
9 shows important factors influencing the system performance (uptime, availability, 
etc.), O&M costs, and thereby maintenance management.  
These factors have to be taken into consideration over the system‟s entire life cycle in 
order to optimize performance. Assuming that the activities in the diagram that 
corrective maintenance is more expensive to carry out than PM. PM and CBM are 
advantageous compared to strategies merely based on corrective maintenance (CM) 
actions.  
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Figure 9: factors influencing system availability and O&M costs 
Assuming that two types of maintenance can be carried out (PM and CM), and that 
the set up costs S, such as preparation and closure of the maintenance activities, a 
simple model of the total maintenance costs per time unit is Ctot(τ): 
Ctot(τ)=  
Pi are costs due to production loss (related to the component‟s availability) and   
is the effective failure rate, depending on the maintenance interval, , for the 
component. Optimization would be to minimize Ctot(τ) by optimizing the interval. I 
have tried to indicate that the maintenance interval, τ, is a key factor in the 
maintenance cost optimization. 
4.3.1 Offshore Production Facilities’ Plant Equipment: impending failure 
detection 
The consequence of component/sub-system failure on a system can be classified into 
three categories, critical, semi-critical and non-critical based on function criticality, 
operating context and complexity of the equipment/technology. The equipment‟s true 
degradation is estimated using condition indicators (or variables) like, vibration 
monitoring (e.g. belt, gear drive, or surfaces with components with relative motion), 
temperature (e.g. electrical components, bearing house, hydraulic pumps etc.), 
lubricant monitoring (transmission components like gears, cams, etc.).  
The monitoring frequency could be periodic/ continuous. The operating context is 
important factor, which influences degradation. The adverse operating context in the 
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offshore can also be classified into three operating regimes (Edwin and Chaturvedi, 
2006), namely; normal, marginal and hostile operating contexts.   
Under the influence of operating context, condition indicator levels are modulated, 
thereby true level of degradation cannot be inferred by the mere trending of condition 
indicator‟s level. Hence, operating context needs to be considered while using 
condition indicator level to understand the true state of equipment. On the other hand, 
the maintenance domain expert does not have a precise knowledge about the 
correlation of the operating context and level of degradation for a given level of 
condition indicator on specific equipment.  Expert System theory (e.g. Artificial 
Intelligence) considers these vagueness and imprecise knowledge (i.e. by integrating 
quantitative and qualitative knowledge) to come up with possibilities of failure 
degradation modes and hence improving our decision making to improve maintenance 
performance.  
4.3.2 Optimizing the Interval between Maintenance Activities ( ) 
Traditional analytical techniques (mathematical and statistical models) needs large 
amount of data, which is difficult to obtain because of constraints i.e. rare events of 
components, human errors and economic considerations for estimation of the failure / 
repair characteristics of the system. Even if data is available, it is often inaccurate and 
thus, subjected to uncertainty, i.e. historical records can only represent the past 
behavior but may be unable to predict the future behavior of the equipment. Further, 
age, adverse operating conditions and the irregularities/imperfection of 
manufacturing/ production processes affects each unit of system differently (Sergaki 
and Kalaitzakis, 2002).  
However, it may be difficult or even impossible to establish rational database to 
accommodate all operating and environmental conditions. In the absence of accurate 
data, rough (approximate) estimates of probabilities can be worked out. The estimates 
provided by experts are inherently subjective and to establish a rational method for 
reliability assessment, such subjective estimates should be merged with statistical 
randomness. 
The uncertainty between initiation of degradation and reaching to unacceptable levels 
is shown in the Figure10 below. As shown in the figure, the performance decreases 
over a period of time and drops down to an unacceptable level (potential failure, tp) 
and leads to a functional failure at a later time (tf). The degradation of a 
component/system may vary widely due to above mentioned factors. Owing to this 
variation and associated randomness, the potential and functional failure times are 
also not precise. Hence, the frequency of monitoring decided on the basis of P-F 
interval (PF Interval = tf - tp) is also a variable. Some say PF interval itself is hard to 
define (Murray, 2007) 
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Figure 10: uncertainty in the PF interval (modified from Edwin and Chaturvedi, 2008) 
 (tp =potential failure time, tf =functional failure time) 
 
Since this interval is uncertain and degradation is a random event (it could be pattern 
A, pattern B, pattern C. etc), predicting an impending failure is highly probabilistic. 
Therefore, the probability of detecting a failure in advance is not a crisp event and 
fuzziness (uncertainty) is associated with it. This uncertainty can be better handled 
with fuzzy logic using appropriate membership function to arrive at estimating 
appropriate possibility level. Fuzzy logic uses to reflect the dispersion of data 
adequately.  The dispersion includes variation in human performance, vagueness in 
adverse operating/environmental conditions and vagueness in the system performance 
due to age. 
Rule-based fuzzy logic can be integrated into the maintenance program to determine 
the times for the periodic PM actions, considering maintenance imperfections. Indeed, 
considering human factors in maintenance programs is indispensable to assure more 
accurate results. However due to the difficulty to handle by their modeling, most 
theoretical maintenance models do not consider these factors.  
Therefore, fuzzy logic can be an important tool to include them. We modify the 
maintenance program at every maintenance action according to the duration of 
maintenance actions and the technician‟s experience seeking to optimize the 
maintenance program („just-in-time‟) so as to minimize the cost or maximize the 
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availability of the system to compensate for high maintenance cost. Fuzzy Inference 
System (FIS) on a hardware platform can be developed for a real-time application.  
Estimating the failure probability distribution with limited/un-organized maintenance 
data may be awkward and not rewarding. Possibility distribution of fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 
1996) and transformation of probability distributions to possibility distributions and 
vice-versa offers a great flexibility and simplicity to compute possibility of events. 
The strength of the fuzzy logic, for examples in the field of reliability engineering, is 
well documented by Bowles (2003) and others. The efficiency of condition-based 
maintenance (CBM) program can be quantified by the ratio of failure modes detected 
in time to the total number of failure modes occurred in a specified interval of time on 
specified equipment. 
Fuzzy Logic theory approach proposes to estimate the “Possibility of failure mode 
detection”. For offshore, three fuzzy variables are important to be considered in the 
fuzzy inference System i.e.:  
 level of condition indicator;  
 frequency of monitoring; and  
 operating context.  
These variables can be expressed as fuzzy sets with linguistic descriptions. For 
instance, treating “condition indicator level” as fuzzy variable, it can be expressed the 
membership function using linguistic terms such as remote, low, moderate, high and 
very high. A schematic representation of fuzzy inference system (FIS) is shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: elements of fuzzy inference system (FIS) 
Input variable is fuzzified using the fuzzy linguistic variable, like remote, low, 
medium and high, very high etc, with an appropriate membership functions. The 
selection of membership function is subjective and depends on the data type and its 
variability in the domain. Expert rule base is, a set of rules mapping the inputs to 
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output under various input levels. There can be many rules, which are applicable 
simultaneously on the input variables and leading to many similar or dissimilar output 
situations. Aggregating these outputs can be done using a method commonly known 
as centroid method of aggregation (or Mamdani rule), which deals with max-min 
approach (Ross, 2000). For example, with the reliability perspective, when the 
possibility of failure mode detection is high, the reliability can be kept at higher levels 
as the required maintenance action to contain degradation level can be planned in 
advance, before an impending failure matures as a failure. With the risk perspective, 
risk can be minimized as risk mitigation can effectively be planned. 
4.3 Brief Overview of Fuzzy Concepts 
 Fuzzy sets, membership function, alpha cuts, and linguistic variable, fuzzy logic 
Fuzzy sets are sets whose elements have degrees of membership. Fuzzy sets were 
introduced by Lotfi A. Zadeh (1965) as an extension of the classical set.  In classical 
set theory, the membership of elements in a set is assessed in binary terms (i.e. an 
element either belongs or does not belong to the set). By contrast, fuzzy set theory 
permits partial membership of elements in a set; this is described with the aid of a 
membership function valued in the real unit interval [0, 1]. Fuzzy sets generalize 
classical sets. In fuzzy set theory, classical sets are usually called crisp sets. The fuzzy 
set theory can be used in a wide range of domains in which information is incomplete 
or imprecise.  
Fuzzy logic is a mathematical approach that analyzes analog input values in terms of 
logical variables that take on continuous values between 0 and 1, in contrast to 
classical logic, which operates on discrete values of either 0 or 1 (true or false).  
The following equations are based on Rajiv et al., (2010) 
                    ……………………………………….……(1) 
A crisp set “A” can be represented by a characteristic function:    
……………………………………(2) 
Where: U: universe of discourse, X: element of U, A: crisp set and N: characteristic 
Function. 
Differing to the classical sets, fuzzy sets accommodate various degree of membership 
on continuous interval [0, 1], where “0” conforms to no membership (i.e. 0%) and 
“1”conforms to full membership (i.e. 100% membership). Mathematically defined by 
equation: 
…………………………….………..(3) 
Where: : Degree of membership of element x in fuzzy set ~  
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Different types of membership functions such as triangular, trapezoidal, gamma and 
rectangular can be used for maintenance analysis. However triangular membership 
functions are widely used for calculating and interpreting maintenance data because 
of their simplicity and understandability (Yadav et al., 2003; Bai and Asgarpoor, 2004 
cited in Rajiv et al., 210). For instance, imprecise/incomplete information such as 
low/high failure rate i.e. about 4 or between 5 and 7 is well represented by triangular 
membership function. In this thesis triangular membership function is used as it not 
only reflects the behavior of various system parameters but also reflects the dispersion 
of the data satisfactorily.  
The dispersion takes care of inherent variation in human performance, vagueness in 
system performance due to age and adverse operating conditions. Thus, it becomes 
insightful for the maintenance experts to arrive at decisions. The a cut of a fuzzy set 
M, denoted as is the set of elements x of a universe of discourse X for which the 
membership function of M is greater than or equal to   i.e. 
……..…..(4) 
The alpha cut provides a convenient way of performing arithmetic operations on 
fuzzy sets and fuzzy numbers including in applying extension principle. Consider a 
triangular fuzzy number defined by triplets (m1, m2, m3) shown in Figure 12, with 
introduction of  cuts, .  The cut is used to define the interval 
of confidence of triangular membership function and is written as equation 5 (for 
details refer to Kokso, 1999 and Ross, 2000). 
…..….(5) 
Moreover, when an event is imprecisely or vaguely defined, the experts would simply 
say that the possibility of occurrence of a given event is “low”, “high”, and 
“comparatively high”. To calculate approximately such subjective events, linguistic 
expressions are used. The analyst can use linguistic variables to assess and compute 
the events using well-defined fuzzy membership functions (Tanaka, 2001 cited in 
Rajiv et al., 2010). For instance, we can use linguistic terms such as “Remote”, 
“Low”, “Moderate”, “High”, and “Very high” to represent probability of occurrence, 
severity and non-detectability in FMEA. 
 
Fuzzy rule base and inference system 
The rule base explains the criticality level of the system for each combination of input 
variables. Normally it is expressed in “If-Then” style (where, „If‟ is an antecedent 
which is compared to the inputs and „Then‟ is a consequent, which is the 
result/output). The input variables are formulated in linguistic terms using approaches 
like Expert Knowledge and expertise. 
By using the inference mechanism an output fuzzy set is obtained from the rules and 
the input variables. There are two most common types of inference systems frequently 
used: 
 The max-min inference and  
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 The max-prod inference method (Zimmermann, 1996; Ross, 2000 cited in 
Rajiv et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 12: A triangular membership function with a cut (modified from Rajiv et al., 2010) 
Defuzzification 
In order to obtain a crisp result from fuzzy output, deffuzification is carried out. 
Different techniques for deffuzification such as centroid, bisector, weighted average, 
etc. exist. The centroid method is the most common use for deffuzification as it gives 
mean value of the parameters, besides its simplicity. 
For example to analyze the behavior of system in quantitative terms various 
parameters of interest such as availability, reliability, expected number of failures, and 
meantime between failures(MTBF) are computed at different alpha cuts. Depending 
on the value, the analyst predicts performance measures for the system. If ,for 
example, the uncertainty in input data is described by means of triangular fuzzy 
numbers, then the possibility distribution of failure rate and repair time is a distorted 
triangle because after applying the fuzzy mathematics, the linear sides of triangle 
changes to parabolic one (Sittithumwat et al., 2004 cited in Rajiv et al., 2010). In 
order to make decisions with respect to maintenance actions it is necessary to convert 
fuzzy output into a crisp value i.e. deffuzification, using centroid method, for 
example. 
4.4 Fuzzy Logic Application to Improve Maintenance 
  Gearbox as an Example  
Gearbox is taken as an example to discuss the failure behavior both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. Gearboxes are used in diverse range of applications within oil 
and gas production facilities. The effective maintenance activities, at relevant 
frequencies, are designed to maintain functionality and prevent catastrophic failure of 
gearboxes thus ensuring that the risk associated with asset business goals covering 
safety, environment, production and cost are limited.  
The main drivers for maintenance that are incorporated in asset typical performance 
standards will typically include the following: 
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 Fluid containment: the maintenance strategy objective is to ensure that process 
fluids are contained under all normal operating circumstances 
 Control of ignition Sources: the maintenance strategy objective is to ensure 
that no sources of ignition are created by gearboxes situated in hazardous areas 
during normal operation. 
 FMECA analysis: Qualitative framework 
To diagnose the unreliable aspects of the machine, root cause failure analysis (RCFA) 
of the gearbox, as a system is carried out by listing all the possible causes related to 
the machine units(see Figure 15). Further, to quantify the sources of unreliability 
related to process problems and identify potential system failure modes, their causes 
and effect on performance of the system, it is decided to conduct failure mode and 
effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) of one of the components. In brief the 
methodology used to compute the scores related to failure of occurrence (Pf), 
likelihood of detection of failure (Pd), and consequence/severity (S) of failure of 
various components are discussed as follows (Sharma et al. 2005a).  
The main objective of FMECA is to discover and prioritize the potential failure 
modes (by analyzing the respective RPN), which pose threats on the system 
performance. The approach involves statistical data collection especially related with 
the frequency of component failures and their likelihood of detectability and severity 
it imposes on system performance. The results of the analysis help maintenance 
personnel to identify the failure modes, their causes and correct them during the 
stages of design and production.  
The critically debated disadvantages of FMEA based on RPN analysis are: 
 Various sets of failure occurrence probability [Pf,], severity [S] and 
detectability [Pd] may produce an identical value, however, the risk 
implication may be totally different which may result in high-risk events may 
go unnoticed.  
 The RPN ranking method neglects the relative importance among Pf, S and Pd. 
The three factors are assumed to have the same importance. In real practical 
applications there is a relative importance among these factors.  
To address these disadvantages related to traditional FMEA, a fuzzy logic application, 
with gearbox as an example, is presented in this thesis to prioritize the failure causes 
in a better way. 
FMECA attempts to predict possible sequences of events that lead to system failure, 
determine their consequences or reoccurrence. Often criticality level of a failure mode 
is expressed using risk priority number (RPN) and is given by: 
RPN=Probability of failure X Severity X Probability of detection= PfXSXPd 
Probability of occurrence of failure [Pf]:  Probability of occurrence of failure is 
evaluated as a function of mean time between failures (MTBFs). The data related to 
mean time between failures of components is obtained from previous historical 
records, maintenance log-books and is then integrated with the experience of 
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maintenance personnel. For instance, if MTBF of component is between two to four 
months then probability of occurrence of failure is high (occurrence rate 0.5-1 
percent) with the score ranging between 7&8. Table 9 presents the linguistic 
assessment of probability of failure occurrence with corresponding MTBF and scores 
assigned. 
Probability of detection of failures [Pd]:The chance of detecting a failure cause or 
mechanism depends on a variety of factors such as ability of operator or maintenance 
experts to detect failure through naked eye or by periodical inspection or with the help 
of machine diagnostic aids such as automatic controls, alarms and digital sensors. For 
instance, probability of detection of failure of a component through naked eye is say, 
0-5% is ranked 1 with non-detectability „Remote‟. The values of Pd for various failure 
causes reported in this thesis are evaluated according to the score reported in Table 9. 
Consequence (severity) of failure (S): Severity of failure is assessed by the possible 
outcome of failure effect on the system performance. The severity of effect may be 
regarded as remote, low, moderate, high or very high. In this paper the data related to 
mean time to repair (MTTR), affect on the quality of the product are used to obtain 
score for severity. For instance, if MTTR of facility/component is less, say lies 
between 12-15 minutes, then effect may be regarded as remote. If external 
intervention is required for repairs, or MTTR exceeds 1/2 days and there is 
appreciable deterioration in the quality of production then effect may be regarded as 
high and if system degrades resulting in line shut down /production stoppage then the 
severity may be regarded as very high. Table 10 presents the traditional FMEA 
analysis for the gearbox. 
 The numerical values of FMEA parameters i.e. Pf, S and Pd are obtained by using the 
discussed methodology. Failure with larger RPN number indicates a high level of 
consequence (HSE, production and economics) compared to the failure mode that has 
lower RPN. In practice many times, it is not possible to quantify the three parameters 
of RPN due to lack of statistics. In such cases subjective judgments can be used. For 
example if an event Y has high rate of occurrences and if X event has low rate of 
occurrence, then allocate number 10 to event Y and 1(or so) to event X on a scale of 
1-10, where 10 indicates high rate of occurrence and 1 indicate a rare rate of 
occurrence. Similarly severity(S) and detection probability (Pd) can also be quantified 
using similar scale and allocating numbers according to our judgments to describe the 
degree of severity or possibility of their detection of failures. (Markeset, 2010) 
From Table 10 it is observed that causes F13 and F15 produce an identical RPN i.e. 
280, however, the failure occurrence rate and failure detectability for both the causes 
are totally different. Also, F4 and F11 though represented by different sets of 
linguistic terms produce identical RPN i.e. 180, which could be misleading. 
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Table 9: Scale used for Pf (probability of failure of occurrence), S (severity) and Pd 
(likelihood of detection of failure) 
Linguistic terms rank MTBF(years) Occurrence (%)  severity effect Likelihood of 
detection (%) 
remote 1 Less than 3 <0.01 Not noticed 0-5 
low 2 1-3 0.01-0.1 Slightly noticed 6-15 
 3    16-25 
moderate 4 0.4-1 0.1-0.5 Slight deterioration in 
system performance 
26-35 
 5    36-45 
 6    46-55 
high 7 2-4months 0.5-1 Significant 
deterioration 
56-65 
 8    66-75 
Very high 9 <2months 1 Production loss and 
non-conforming 
products 
76-85 
 10    86-100 
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Table 10: generic modes of effect analysis (FMEA) 
function Function
al failure 
Failure modes Failure effects Failure characteristic Pf  S  Pd RPN 
1. To 
transmit 
rotary 
power & 
contain oil 
and gas 
vapors 
A. Fails to 
transmit 
rotary 
power 
 
 
F1 
 
 
   Gearbox        
bearing failure- 
Radial or thrust. 
Collapse of bearing seizure, loss 
of sealing and internal damage 
Random failure resulting in bearing 
wear, increased vibration, noise, 
increased bearing temperature, reduced 
oil pressure, shaft damage and bearing 
seizure 
5    6      8 320 
F2           Input shaft        
misalignment 
 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output.  
Random failure 7    7      6 276 
F3 Gear teeth wear  Increase in noise, temperature 
and vibration. If a tooth falls off 
there will be loss of functional 
gearbox and significant damage 
to the gearbox. 
Loss of drive, damage to driving and 
driven machine 
4    6      7 168 
F4 Coupling from 
driver failure 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output.  
Loss of drive transmission 4   9      5 180 
F5 Loss of lubricant 
function 
 
Oil discolored, increased bearing 
wear 
Time related wear out resulting in an 
increase in vibration 
6   6      6 216 
F6 Failure of 
lubrication 
circulation 
 
Eventually gearbox seizes Random failure indicated by loss of lube 
oil pressure 
5   8       6 320 
F7 Gearbox failure 
for any reason 
whilst shutdown 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output. Failure will 
not be apparent during normal 
operation 
On start up, unable to provide prestart 
lubrication, pump start permissive do not 
operate unable to start  main pump 
3  6        8 144 
F8 Drive cones wear  Drive belt slippage resulting in 
an increase in noise, 
temperature, and vibration 
Random failure resulting loss of oil to 
surrounding area 
8   8        8 512 
F9 Failure of 
variable speed 
adjustment 
device 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output. 
Eventual loss of lubrication 7   9        7 441 
B.fail to 
contain 
oil and 
vapors 
F1
0 
Shaft oil seal 
leakage 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output. 
Random failure 6  5        5 150 
F1
1 
 
Gear casing 
joints external 
leakage. All 
other leaks than 
shaft leaks 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output. 
Random failure resulting loss of oil to 
surrounding area 
5  6    6 180 
F1
2 
 
Over feeling of 
gearbox with oil 
Over pressurization of the 
gearbox resulting in leakage of 
oil from shafts 
Time related 8  9     9 648 
F1
3 
Gearbox failure 
for any reason 
whilst shutdown 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output. 
Loss of drive transmission when required 5  8    7 280 
F1
4 
Oil supply pipe 
works fittings 
leak externally 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output. Atomized oil 
leak possible 
Random failure resulting in loss of 
lubrication oil to surrounding area, 
pressurized oil leak possible, fire danger 
5  9    6 270 
F1
5 
Pinion oil supply 
nozzle blocked 
Loss of unit output to system, 
loss of redundancy or reduced 
production output. 
Random failure resulting in loss of 
lubrication oil. Increase  heating effect, 
pinion failure 
8 7     5 280 
F1
6 
Gearbox breath 
choked 
 
Over pressurization of the 
gearbox resulting in leakage of 
oil from shafts 
random 5  6    8 240 
F1
7 
Failure of 
hydraulic/lubrica
tion system 
Loss of lubrication & cooling 
increased bearing wear 
eventually seizes. 
Time related 8  7    9 504 
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Fuzzy Approach: Qualitative Framework 
The above listed limitations of traditional FMEA are addressed by using fuzzy logic 
developed using MATLAB based on fuzzy set principles as discussed above. The 
basic system architecture of fuzzy logic consists of three main modules i.e. knowledge 
base module and user input/output interface module as shown in Figure 12. 
The input parameters i.e. Pf, S and Pd, used in FMEA, were fuzzified using 
appropriate membership functions to determine degree of membership in each input 
class. For the output variable, to rank riskiness level, both triangular and trapezoidal 
membership functions were used (Figure 13(a) and 13 (b)). Multiple experts with 
different degree of competencies (skill, knowledge) were used to construct the 
membership function.  
The resulting fuzzy inputs were evaluated in fuzzy inference system, which makes use 
of well-defined rule base based on the membership functions of the three input 
variables Pf, S, Pd with, five fuzzy sets (remote, low, moderate, high and v. high). 
Finally to express the riskiness/criticality level of the failure so that corrective or 
remedial actions can be prioritized accordingly, deffuzification is done using centroid 
method to obtain crisp value from the fuzzy conclusion set. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: membership functions for: (a) input (Pf, S and Pd); (b) the output (RPN) (modified from 
Rajiv, et al., and 2010) 
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Table 11: FMECA and Fuzzy Logic 
Failure 
modes 
FEMCA  
RPN 
output 
FEMCA  
ranking 
Fuzzy RPN Fuzzy 
ranking 
F1 320 4 0.664 3 
F2 294 4 0.660 4 
F3 168 9 0.617 6 
F4 180 8 0.655 5 
F5 216 7 0.511 9 
F6 320 4 0.664 3 
F7 144 10 0.521 8 
F8 512 1 0.667 2 
F9 441 3 0.679 1 
F10 150 10 0.511 9 
F11 180 8 0.511 9 
F12 648 1 0.699 1 
F13 280 5 0.664 3 
F14 270 5 0.657 5 
F15 280 5 0.660 4 
F16 240 7 0.617 6 
F17 504 2 0.621 3 
 
The summary of the results obtained through traditional and fuzzy method is 
presented in Table 11. From Table , it is observed that for events F13 and F14 where 
Pf, S and Pd are described by “Moderate, High” and “High”, and “High, High, 
Moderate” respectively, the traditional FMEA output is 280 for both, this means that 
both the events are prioritized at same rank i.e. 5
th
 . But the defuzzified outputs for 
F13 and F15 are 0.664 and 0.660 respectively which shows that F13 should be ranked 
higher (i.e. 3
rd
) than F15 (i.e. 4
th
). Also, for causes F4 & F5 which are represented by 
different sets of linguistic terms, (i.e. „Moderate‟, „Very high‟ and „Moderate‟; 
„Moderate‟, „Moderate‟ and „Moderate‟) produce identical RPN i.e. 180.(i.e. 8th ) . 
But fuzzy logic output so obtained is different for both of them (i.e. 5
th
 and 9
th
, 
respectively). 
4.5 Failure Analysis and Improvements: Root Cause Failure 
Analysis (RCFA) Strategies  
The effectiveness of the maintenance is evaluated systematically on the basis of 
recorded data for performance and technical condition in respect of facilities or parts 
thereof. The party responsible continually improves health, environment and safety by 
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identifying the processes, activities and products that need improvements, and 
implement necessary improvement measures. The measures must be followed up and 
their effect must be evaluated. The personnel have to be stimulated to take part in 
identifying weaknesses and suggest solutions. Therefore it is critical to choose the 
KPIs that support the overall goal and strategy the company has for the operational 
phase the asset. Setting targets, measuring performance and acting on the results are 
the key to the success of a company‟s maintenance management.  
When it comes to developing useful KPIs, it is easier to measure what was done in the 
past to generate lagging indicators.  It is more difficult to identify and measure 
reliable leading indicators which predict future performance (for more details about 
KPIs see section. 2.1.2).  For practical reasons some trigger levels are applied above 
which a more detailed investigation is done aiming at finding the root cause for the 
failure.  
The triggers can be, for example, related to: 
 HSE  related equipment failure 
 Production losses 
 Cos of single failure events in terms of time, repair cost or spare cost 
 Number of repeated failures over a given time period for key components  
 Technical condition assessments, etc. 
The aim of RCFA is to: 
 avoid reoccurrence of the same event by finding the root cause  
  institute remedial actions accordingly, and 
 organizational learning from the event  for continuous improvements 
Learning from failure and events is a key to continuous improvement of performance 
of a plant and an organization. The following Figure 14 shows in general the work 
flow for continuous improvement. 
The root cause failure analysis is a structured process aiming to reveal underlying 
physical, human, organizational or latent causes for unwanted event/incident. By 
learning from these underlying/root causes, proper actions can be taken at the „right 
time‟ and the right measures implemented in order to prevent future unwanted related 
events.  
As a result from the root cause and failure analysis, typical factors that could be 
subjected to attention and/or improvement are: 
 Design 
 External factors having negative impact on expected lifetime of 
equipment/component 
 Condition monitoring indicators 
 Operational conditions and/or procedures 
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 Competence(skill, knowledge and attributes) 
 Procedures related to installations, repairs, modifications or reinstallations 
By using root because failure analysis on a regular basis, one enables continuous 
improvements of existing equipment, related work processes and routines in operation 
and maintenance. In order for the work to be predictive, it is also of great importance 
that suggested measures are not just locally implemented out but also across relevant 
plants, organizations and regions in an integrated operational setting. 
 
Figure 14: Root Cause and Failure Analysis improvement loop (adapted from DNV, 2009) 
It is important to be unbiased towards the cause of failure in the initial stage of an 
assessment as the real cause can be quite different from what we observed as the 
trigger for the event. In order to narrow the search for the root cause, as shown in 
Figure 16 below, a set of tools and methods are available, such as: STEP (sequential 
time event plotting); FMECA (failure mode effect and criticality analysis); FTA (fault 
tree analysis) etc. 
The RCFA process is an elimination of causes via collecting of evidence and logical 
reasoning in order to narrow the search for the root cause (see Figure 15). 
58 
 
 
Figure 15: RCFA elimination process (adapted from NDV, 2009) 
Root cause might mean different things depending on where in an organization the 
question is asked. For example, a failed bearing can be: 
 simply lack of lubrication or installation misalignment for a technical person  
 lack of training of maintenance and operation personnel for the manager  
 employment policy for an operator  
 And the case can be approval of license to operate for authorities   
An integrated operational approach solves the above problems. The „loss causation‟ 
model (Appendix D), for example, is a model aiming to align these different „causes‟. 
The model is reactive in the sense that it explains events, and proactive in the sense 
that preventive efforts can be instituted to avoid reoccurrence. The model also is a 
mean of avoiding blaming technical causes only put points to the organization, its 
handling of people/organization, procedure/standards and capacity. The model was 
developed connected to safety management, but it is also relevant in connection to 
operation and maintenance management and hence can be taken as a generic model. 
For complex and advanced industrial assets he following three things must be 
considered to improve RCFA methods; 
 New tools for conducting root cause analysis 
 Increase monitoring and control of the physical asset 
 Reporting of incidents/events in a more comprehensive way 
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CHAPTER 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
5.1  Work Summary and Results 
New technologies are becoming advanced and complex for offshore Oil & Gas 
production facilities. However, this advancement and complexity in technology 
creates a more complicated and time consuming forensic processes for finding causes 
of failure, or diagnostic processes to identify events that reduce performance. As a 
result, micro-sensors, efficient signaling and communication technologies for 
collecting data efficiently, expert software (such as fuzzy logic, neural networks, and 
simulation based optimization) have been developed, in parallel, to manage such 
complex assets.  
Given the nature and scale of ongoing changes on complexities, there are emerging 
concerns that increasing complexities, ill-defined interfaces, unforeseen events can 
easily lead to serious performance failures and major risks. To avoid such undesirable 
circumstances, „just-in-time‟ measures of performance to ensure fully functional is 
absolutely necessary  
This paper highlighted improvement mechanisms to establish „just-in-time‟ 
maintenance by developing an integrated maintenance management framework to 
optimize maintenance program and to ensure continuous improvements in 
maintenance strategies based on maintenance domain experts as well as operational 
and historic data. Figure16 shows the overall vision of the integrated maintenance 
management can contribute to improving overall performance of the asset. As shown 
in the Figure 16 the repairable asset needs „just-in-time‟ maintenance intervention in 
order to perform full functional. The system performance curve then follows the same 
path until it reaches the next failure point. Potential cost benefits can be gained by 
saving the system from unnecessary down time. 
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Figure 16: Optimized performance curve for repairable equipment 
In the above optimized performance curve for repairable equipment, we can argue 
that by establishing „just-in-time‟ maintenance intervention, maintenance related costs 
can be improved for the system. This is the concept that maintenance experts must 
consider while implementing new techniques (e.g. intelligent techniques) for 
performance optimization. 
To put it in nut shell, the output of the thesis, as a result of this integrated maintenance 
management framework, optimized maintenance performance helps to improve HSE 
risk levels, production regularity and cost related to maintenance as depicted in the 
Figure 17 below. 
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Figure 17: Integrated maintenance management to improve maintenance performance 
5.2 Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
Integrated maintenance management framework in the Oil and Gas Industries helps to 
explore the use of sophisticated technical solutions. The application of such 
sophisticated technologies in maintenance and operations of complex production 
facilities can bring huge benefits in terms of reducing risk. To utilize such 
sophisticated technologies, it is important to understand the interconnected issues and 
challenges. Some of the potential benefits of the use of such integrated maintenance 
management include: 
 Enhancement in terms of better and effective control of potential events and 
incidents that may lead to functional failures. 
 Model, analyze and predict the behavior of systems in more realistic manner 
(removes vagueness in maintenance planning). 
  Manage the dilemma of direct (quantitative) evaluation of intangible 
(qualitative) criterions used in traditional analytical methods with the help of 
well defined membership functions to synthesize fuzzy information. 
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 Helps in a quick review of ranking of numerous maintenance tasks to plan 
suitable maintenance practices /strategies for improving system performance        
( Jardine, 1991; Sherwin, 2000; Sharma et al. 2005b, c; Pintelon et al., 2006). 
 Helps to eliminate “over/under  maintenance” 
 Helps to find out hidden failure causes. 
Successful applications of various maintenance optimization models are rare. The 
major problems in applying the models are: computational difficulties; difficulties of 
collection of data and modeling of failure distribution. It is vital to carry out an in-
depth investigation to: 
 develop an effective methodology for modeling equipment‟s failure 
distribution or degradation process, which considers what information is 
required for modeling, how such information is obtained, how the model 
parameters are estimated, and how the model is updated when new 
information becomes available(Albert  et. al. , 2006); 
 I believe that extensive data collected from asset maintenance logs and historic 
records can be analyzed to justify the cost-benefit analysis of the „just-in-time‟ 
maintenance interventions and is therefore recommended as a topic for further 
research. 
.  
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Appendix 
A-Maintenance Management model  
 
Figure A-1 Maintenance management model (PSA, 1998) 
 
B-Main Function and Sub Function Classification 
For example, the sub functions of typical process equipment can be classified as 
follows to cover all requirements. These sub functions are: 
> Main task (term describing the task). 
> Pressure relief. 
> Shutdown, process. 
> Shutdown, equipment. 
> Controlling 
> Monitoring 
> Local indication. 
> Manual shut-off. 
> Containment 
> Other functions. 
A comprehensive assessment of the standard list of sub functions has to be completed 
with other sub functions relevant for the particular operation to easily identify 
functional failures. All equipment (identified by its tag number) in each instrument 
loop be assigned to one sub function. If a sub function performs multiple tasks, the 
equipment will be assigned to the most critical sub function. The standard sub 
functions are only to be used if relevant. When appropriate, other repetitive sub 
functions (i.e. lubricating, containment of different services, etc.) may be used. 
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n 
Figure B-1:  Illustrates how equipment in a MF is assigned to standard sub functions 
(adopted from, NORSOK Z008 rev. 2) 
 
FigureB-2: Functional Hierarchy, example with standard sub function and classification 
(modified from NORSOK Z008 rev. 2) 
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C- Maintenance program and Planning (as recommended by 
NORSOK-Z008) 
As an example a work flow for establishment of maintenance programme for a new 
plant is describe below and illustrated in Figure C-1. The figure is based on NORSOK 
Z008.  
 
Figure C-1: work process for the establishment of maintenance programme (NORSOK   
Z008 rev. 3) 
The process is based on the following principles: 
 Input to the process is the technical hierarchy and a functional grouping. The 
classification acts as a screening process in the sense that equipment groups 
related to safety barriers are handled directly as such equipment shall have set 
performance standards with reliability requirements and associated test 
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intervals. Furthermore, for many safety systems there will exist additional 
maintenance tasks to be done like cleaning, lubrication, etc. which should be 
described in generic maintenance concepts for this equipment group. These 
data and tasks are then input to the maintenance programme. 
 Formal FMECA/RBI/RCM to determine failure mode, failure mechanisms 
and cause tasks is done for new equipment representing high risk and where 
no GMC are available. 
 For equipment where maintenance has been done for some time and where 
maintenance task lists are available, the optimization process is mainly to 
challenge the existing regime regarding content and frequency of the existing 
activities as well adding new once based on experienced failure degradations. 
This implies that maintenance and operation personnel familiar with the 
installation is closely involved with this work. 
 FMECA/RBI/RCM analysis can be transformed to a generic maintenance 
concept for later use on similar equipment  
 For equipments classified with low consequence of failure, a planned 
corrective maintenance strategy may be selected (run to failure). However, a 
minimum set of activities to prolong a lifetime may also be considered.  
 Cost/benefit analysis is used to determine maintenance strategy for the 
offshore production facilities and intervals based on consequence of failure, 
cost of maintenance and how this maintenance will affect future probability of 
the identified failure modes. 
 Finally, all the maintenance tasks should be packed and scheduled considering 
plant production plans, resources requirements, turnaround schedule, etc. to 
derive to the final maintenance plan. 
The following Figure C-2 is such as example showing selection of work orders to 
prioritize (maintenance planning as recommended by NORSOK-Z008) 
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Figure C-2: priority of corrective work orders based on risk of failure (based on NORSOK-
Z008 rev. 3) 
The traditional process involves the following points: 
 Assigning the consequence of failures to the case. It can be done via criticality 
classification of the component. This consequence always be supplied by 
information regarding the actual failure modes, the actual operational 
condition of the plant, possibilities for re-routing the process, etc. as such the 
process cannot be automatic, but requires involvement from personnel 
knowing the production facilitates and the actual case. 
 Assigning the failure impact. The failure impact is a coarse probability scale. 
(Critical, degraded and incipient failure), see Table 6 below. 
 The risk associated with the consequence and probabilities as well as actions 
from this risk must be defined in given criteria, for example by means of risk 
matrix. Table 8 shows an example of a risk matrix model described as a risk 
matrix used to determine precedence of work orders. 
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 D-The ‘Loss Causation’ Model 
 
Figure D-1:  the ‘loss causation’ model (adopted from DNV) 
E- Reporting 
The ISO 14224 standard gives recommendations for reporting of data related to 
maintenance. The results from the maintenance activities should be logged on the 
work order. Typical issues to be reported are: 
> Equipment/tag 
> Failure mode 
> Failure cause and mechanism 
> Start and end date 
> Spare parts consumption 
> Man-hour activities 
> Equipment down time and etc. 
Below are lists necessary information to be registered in order to comply with ISO 
14224. 
 Maintenance data 
> Maintenance record identification 
> Equipment identification/location 
> Failure record identification(relevant for CM only) 
> Date of maintenance 
> Maintenance category(CM, PM) 
> Active maintenance time 
> Downtime and etc. 
 Failure data 
> Failure record identification 
> Equipment identification/location 
> Failure date 
> Failure mode 
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> Failure impact on equipment(critical degraded or incipient failure) 
> Failure mechanism 
> Failure cause 
> Sub unit failed maintainable item failed, etc. 
 For safety systems, the results should be reported in a way that enables back tracking 
to individual units, i.e. individual PSVs, gas detectors, etc. as opposed to reporting 
performance for a group of equipment. 
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